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Abstract
The objective of this research was to describe the types of business networks formed to meet the requirements established by the new bidding law, the
Differential Public Procurement Regime, the innovations of this bidding system and the effect on the construction supply chain. This is a descriptive
study based on a qualitative–quantitative analysis of a case study of road works on BR-381/MG, in Minas Gerais, Brazil. The units of analysis
were the bidding documents, respective contracts, and the construction sites. The results showed that 40 companies took part in the bidding process
in 13 cooperative consortia, 8 of which were vertical and horizontal networks, and 5 were vertical networks. An incremental innovation related to
the project delivery method was identified between the government and construction companies in Brazil by means of integrated design and build
procurement, which changed relationships within the construction supply chain by moving the design supplier into the contractor consortium and
improved supply chain management. Moreover, inversion of stages by the new bidding law has increased agility in procurement of public works,
as prices are analyzed prior to the other documents.
© 2017 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
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Introduction
Internationalization of the economy has caused changes in
management of businesses that seek organizational configura-
tions adapted to a newly established reality. Forming business
networks is one of the strategies adopted to obtain the new
productivity and quality standards required. This cooperative
business network allows for the creation of strategic alliances,
such as consortia. With these, companies aim to complement the
skills of one another in order to enter markets within the new
world scenario (Olave & Amato Neto, 2001).
Companies participate in cooperative networks in order to
enter new markets and maintain or improve their position in
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established markets (Quandt, 2012). Thus, they create compet-
itive advantages by boosting their partners’ skills (Araújo &
Guerrini, 2012; Jorde & Teece, 1989; Miranda, 2010). The exist-
ence of so many cooperative alliances, such as joint ventures,
consortia, minority interests, and research or production coop-
eration agreements is no surprise (Lastres & Cassiolato, 2003;
Wernerfelt & Karnani, 1987).
The Differential Public Procurement Regime [Regime Difer-
enciado de Contratac¸ão] (DPPR) came into force in August
2011, aimed at contracting sporting infrastructures for the com-
petitions beginning in 2013, with the Confederations Cup, and
ending in 2016, with the Olympic Games, held in Rio de
Janeiro, which allows for the formation of business consor-
tia.
The National Transportation Infrastructure Department
[Departamento de Infraestrutura de Transporte] (DNIT, 2013)
employs the Differential Public Procurement Regime (DPPR)
widely in their bidding processes, including the case under
study, tender notice No. 165/2013. The object of this tender
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notice is to increase traffic capacity on the BR-381/MG high-
way, in the Metropolitan Region of Belo Horizonte – one of the
Brazilian cities hosting the Confederations Cup and the World
Cup, and the headquarters for the United Kingdom’s Olympic
team.
The objective of this research is to describe the types
of business networks formed to meet the requirements set
out by the DPPR, the innovations of the DPPR bidding
system, and the regime’s effect on the construction supply
chain.
Literature review
Business cooperative strategy
Business networks are types of relationships whose objec-
tive is to provide some kind of benefit for its members (De
Lima & Campos Filho, 2009). Companies can cooperate in many
ways, from a simple business connection involving the exchange
of money for products to a complex integration of goods, ser-
vices, financing, and systematically managed information (Eiriz,
2001).
The network typology can be constructed by analyzing the
position of a company in relation to the others. According to
the position occupied by companies in a network, their verti-
cal location upstream or downstream in the supply chain can be
identified, as well as its horizontal location at the same opera-
tional level of the focal firm (Britto, 2000).
Competing companies can constitute consortia of horizon-
tal cooperative networks due to mutual gaps of complementary
skills required to attain certain objectives they would otherwise
fail to meet, or in order to create a synergy between their isolated
skills (Andrade & Hoffmann, 2010). There are also consortia of
vertical cooperative networks, when non-competing companies
established at different levels of the supply chain form an alliance
(Britto, 2000; Masquietto, Sacomano Neto, & Giuliani, 2011;
Moro & Glitz, 2013).
Civil construction business networks are formed with the
purpose of obtaining complementary skills and improving the
position of its members in relation to the industry competi-
tion (Barbosa, Zilber, & Toledo, 2009). Constituting business
networks in the production chain can bring about competitive
advantages, to attract new ventures for the network members,
or to improve the development of construction in progress
(Casarotto, 2002).
In Brazil, Law No. 6.404, of 15 December 1976, regulated
formation of consortia for the building sector. “Consortium
means an association of companies, by means of a contract,
which aims to perform a specific enterprise” (Miranda, 2010, p.
4).
Bidding system
Heinen (2014) states that the Differential Public Procurement
Regime (DPPR) is an attempt to change the current procurement
process for supply of goods and services. The DPPR’s inno-
vations are practices found in public and private international
organizations and in the Brazilian private sector. However, the
regime is groundbreaking compared to General Bidding Law
No. 8.666/1993. “The State is giving the private sector a task
that has traditionally been theirs, i.e. drawing up of the basic
designs” (Heinen, 2014, p. 40).
The new bidding regime set out by Law No. 12.462/2011
allows for the transfer of responsibilities around technical engi-
neering projects to firms contracted to execute the works.
Bidders submit the preliminary designs of the desired end
product, with companies being responsible for preparing the
executive designs. This transfers to them many of the risks that
were previously the responsibility of contracting parties (Dotti
& Junior, 2013; Schwind, 2014).
Also noteworthy are the bidding systems used in procure-
ment processes, which cover three key domains: the bidding
type, the execution regime, and the project delivery method, all
of which must be mutually supporting (Darrington & Lichtig,
2010).
According to Ferreira and Santos (2012), Bicalho (2013),
Heinen (2014), and Quintella (2014), the potential innovations
in the processes of contracting infrastructure works are related
to the criteria of bidding type (company selection), execution
regime (form of measurement and payment of services ren-
dered), and delivery method (project scope).
Each construction project requires appropriate choices for the
project delivery system. The project delivery system includes
the bidding type, the type of contract and the project deliv-
ery method (Azevedo, 2005; Thomsen, Darrington, Dunne, &
Lichtig, 2013).
The bidding type is related to the selection criteria that
determine winning bidder, e.g. the lowest price model, the qual-
itative criterion model – such as the best technical merit – and
a combination of technical merit and lowest price type. It is
the granting criterion (Chaovalitwongse, Wang, Williams, &
Chaovalitwongse, 2012; El Wardani, Messner, & Horman, 2006;
Safa, Yee, Rayside, & Haas, 2016).
The execution regime is the type of contract, which speci-
fies how to measure and compensate the contractor for services
rendered, e.g. lump-sum, unit price, guaranteed maximum
price (GMP) and cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts (Pakkala, 2012;
Thomsen et al., 2013).
The project delivery method refers to the project scope, which
encompasses the scope of the product to be delivered and how
to manage it and the relationship with its owner, e.g. design-
bid-build (DBB) and design-build (DB) (Vellalos & Gordon,
2012).
The DBB is the traditional project delivery method. In this
method, first the owner prepares or hires a designer com-
pany to produce construction drawings and specifications. Then,
through a bidding process, they hire a contractor for the construc-
tion works (El Wardani et al., 2006; Martin, Lewis, Petersen, &
Peters, 2016; Yu, Shen, & Shi, 2016).
In the DB method, the owner hires one single company or
consortium to deliver both the design and construction. Upon
conclusion, the owner is responsible for the operation and con-
servation of the product delivered (El Wardani et al., 2006;
Ghadamsil & Braimah, 2016; Yu et al., 2016).
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Integration of supply chain companies is an innovation in the
project delivery method. Horizontal and vertical integration of
supply chain participants provides an opportunity to improve
agility in project delivery (Naoum & Egbu, 2016).
Government strategy: innovation in the integrated DPPR
In 1993, the Brazilian federal government enforced General
Bidding Law No. 8.666/1993, which addresses public pro-
curement processes, including contracting of companies for
deployment of basic infrastructures (Brazil, 1993).
The DPPR applied to contracting of road works allows con-
tracting of companies to prepare technical engineering (design)
and building (production) projects of the enterprise to be
included as the object of bidding documents (Morano, 2013).
Article 2 of DPPR Law No. 12.462/2011 provides for the pos-
sibility of contracting the executive engineering project and
the construction works in an integrated manner, including the
building works needed to relocate families occupying the public
spaces where road works would be performed (Brazil, 2011).
The DPPR is a law created to complement and present inno-
vative alternatives to Law No. 8.666/1993 (Ferreira & Santos,
2012). The existence and simultaneous enforcement of Laws
No. 8.666/1993 and No. 12.462/2011 is imperative (Quintella,
2014). In 2014, a reform of this law was proposed, which aimed
to encompass, in general terms, its application scope (Almeida,
2014).
Supply chain and boundaries of organizations
Many organizations define their boundaries based on their
skills and relationship with agents upstream and downstream
their supply chains. Establishment of a company’s boundaries is
associated with its core skills and its decisions regarding internal
production or purchase from suppliers. Boundaries are deter-
mined as the internal activities that create more added value for
the client are defined, with the objective of gaining a sustain-
able competitive advantage (Hamel & Prahalad, 1990; Quinn
and Hilmer, 1994).
Focal firms began to focus on their supply chain, aiming to
create partnerships with their suppliers and buyers upstream and
downstream, respectively, in order to adapt to the competitive
reality established in globalized markets, with the intention of
increasing competitiveness, which sometimes creates competi-
tion among supply chains (Di Serio & Sampaio, 2001; Kaare &
Koppel, 2012; Tiwari, Shepherd, & Pandey, 2014).
Concept and types of innovation
Innovation is defined as the ability to create new value at the
intersection of business and technology (Cane, 2005). Compa-
nies combine changes in technology and in the business model.
In addition to technological innovations in products and services,
enabling processes and technology, organizational innovations
in the business model take place in the way companies are
managed (Schumpeter, 1943; Tigre, 2006).
Innovation comprises changes to one or more of the six
components of two levers: technology (product and service
offerings, process technologies, enabling technologies) and
business model (value proposition, supply chain and target
customer). Innovation is incremental when it leads to small
improvements in existing products and business processes. It
is semi-radical when it includes little or no changes to one of the
innovation levers and substantial changes to the other. On the
other hand, it is radical when it includes substantial changes to
the levers in both technology and business model (Davila et al.,
2006).
With regard to the technology levers, the product or service is
what a company offers in the market, process technologies are
related to how products are manufactured, and enabling tech-
nologies to information and communication technologies and
how fast they are incorporated. In the business model levers, the
value proposition is what is sold and delivered to the market, the
supply chain is how it is created and delivered to the market, and
the target customer is to whom it is delivered (Alves, Freitas, &
Rolon, 2014; Davila et al., 2006).
Methodology
This is a descriptive research which aims to identify the types
of business networks formed in the bidding process of the DPPR,
the bidding system and its effects on the supply chain. Direct
observation was done at working sites, and contracts signed
between consortia and DNIT were studied. It is a case study
of the bidding process of road infrastructure works by the anal-
ysis of the DNIT tender process No. 165/2013 (Brazil, 2013)
and the worksites.
This study falls within the qualitative and quantitative
approach. The qualitative aspect of this study lies in its inten-
tion to describe the type of network formed among companies
stemming from the use of the DPPR in the procurement process
and to devise the factors that influence consortia formation. The
quantitative approach lies on the use of a Likert scale, in which
the research participants were asked to express their agreement
or disagreement with the statements provided in a questionnaire
applied based on a pre-defined scale. The measurement instru-
ment proposed by Likert aims to evaluate participants’ level of
agreement with regard to a series of statements (Sanches et al.,
2011).
Data collection instruments and research execution
The data collection instrument was a questionnaire with
open-ended questions and one with closed questions. The ques-
tionnaires were prepared with questions regarding the analysis
categories indicated in Chart 1, directly related to the specific
objectives of this study and used as a guide to collect data for
this essay.
The names of respondents and their organizations have been
kept confidential. The questionnaires were sent to the profes-
sionals of the companies taking part in the bidding process and
to the professionals of companies and offices involved in matters
relative to DNIT tender notice No. 165/2013.
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Chart 1. Analytical research model.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
All of the professionals were contacted by telephone, e-mail,
or in person. In spite of the restriction posed by the confiden-
tiality of companies, consortia and managers’ identities, the
research was fully adhered to. It is worth noting the interest
shown by respondents throughout the entire data collection pro-
cess.
Data collection by means of questionnaires and interview
was performed with managers of construction companies and
designers of the works under study, DNIT managers, managers
of companies taking part in the bidding process – even the ones
that have been outbid – and law firms that provided support for
the companies during the bidding process.
The professionals who took part in the research are widely
representative in their field of knowledge, well-known for their
publications and research in their field, as well as in the mar-
ket.
During the data collection stage, a semi-structured question-
naire with 10 open-ended questions was applied to 11 groups
of respondents consisting of managers of the companies in the
consortia originally constituted for participation in the bidding
process, including those who were terminated after having been
outbid, as well as the group of managers of the contracting
organization (DNIT). Respondents from terminated consortia,
even when physically apart, established communication among
them in order to form a group of respondents for the open-ended
questionnaire.
Additionally, an interview was carried out with one of the
contract managers of the case study construction work. This
interview was conducted at the headquarters of the company
participating in the consortium. The interview was carried out in
accordance with the case study protocol, using the same structure
of the open-ended questions in the questionnaire applied. It was
digitally recorded by the respondent himself, who arranged for
its transcription and, subsequently, sent the typed text to the
interviewer. A few statements deemed relevant were noted at the
time of the interview by a person authorized by the respondent.
The interview generated ten pages when transcribed.
It was possible to identify and highlight standard answers
from participants from the answered questionnaire with open-
ended questions. Although the answers to the open-ended
questions represented the opinion of the majority of each group,
we chose to apply a questionnaire with 22 closed questions to
each member of the 11 groups formed, aiming to verify the level
of agreement with the open-ended questions.
Altogether, 50 questionnaires with closed questions were
applied to the members of the 11 groups of open-ended ques-
tion respondents and, in the end, 42 questionnaires with properly
answered closed questions were returned.
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Chart 2. Interpretation of intensity of degree of agreement with statement
Source: Adapted from Davis (1976, p. 70).
The questionnaire’s closed questions were deliberately for-
mulated so as to relate to the standard inferred from the analysis
and interpretation of answers to the open-ended questions, aim-
ing to verify agreement of respondents with the inferences. Chart
1 presents the list of open-ended and closed questions associated
with each specific objective.
The closed questions were designed using the 7-point Lik-
ert scale corresponding to the following levels of agreement:
Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Somewhat Agree (SWA), Nei-
ther agree nor disagree (NAD), Somewhat disagree (SWD),
Disagree (D) and Strongly Disagree (SD). The option Insuf-
ficient Knowledge (IK) was also available for respondents who
considered themselves unable to provide an opinion.
The results of the closed-question questionnaires on the Lik-
ert scale allowed us to determine the Observed Median, the
respondents Disagreeing with the Statements (Ds), the ones
Agreeing with the Statements (As), and the Degree of Agree-
ment with the Statements (DAs).
The observed median is the column inside the interval
Likert scale used in this study, where the participant represent-
ing 50% of respondents is found; Ds = Disagreeing with the
statement refers to the number of respondents who disagreed
with the statement given by equation SWD+D+SD + NAD/2;
As = Agreeing with the statement refers to the number of respon-
dents who agreed with the statement provided by equation
As + A + SA + NAD/2; (Sanches et al., 2011).
The degree of agreement with the statement (DAs) cor-
responds to the percentage of respondents agreeing with the
statements (As), in the case of statements with direct mean-
ing. For statements with reversed meaning, i.e. built so that the
desired value is found in the Strongly Disagree (SD) column,
the degree of agreement refers to the percentage of respondents
disagreeing with the statement (Ds) (Sanches et al., 2011). In
the end, the degree of agreement was calculated for each of the
22 closed questions.
Inferences were obtained from the analysis of the open ques-
tions. Since these inferences are correlated with a particular
group of closed questions, the average degree of agreement of
the closed questions group determines the inference’s degree of
agreement.
Once the relationships between open and closed questions
were established, it was possible to show the average degree
of agreement of the closed statements related to a particular
inference of the open question.
The calculated Degree of Agreement was interpreted accord-
ing to the framework defined by Davis (1976), based on the scale
of intensity of the degree of inference agreement, as presented
in Chart 2.
The documentary research and direct observations began in
April 2015 and were concluded in January 2016. The interview
and application of the questionnaire to the managers took place
between December 2015 and January 2016.
Analysis and interpretation of results
Analysis category 1: types of networks among companies
It was verified that 40 companies participated in the bid-
ding process of DNIT tender notice 165/2013, grouped into
13 networks in consortium format, whereas 5 were constituted
by vertical business networks upstream the supply chain, 8 by
simultaneously vertical and horizontal business networks. A sin-
gle isolated company also participated.
Table 1 presents the percentage analysis of the types of
consortia constituted as to the partnerships formed among com-
peting companies of the building works field and the partnerships
with companies specializing in designing and delivering techni-
cal engineering projects.
There is a predominance of consortia of simultaneously ver-
tical and horizontal companies, representing 61.54% of the total
of consortia formed. This shows that the focal firms have sought
to form networks in a consortium format with the design compa-
nies belonging to the construction supply chain and, at the same
time, with companies that usually compete in the construction
market, seeking to complement their assets.
It is also evident that 38.46% of the total of consortia con-
stituted were of the vertical type, formed by the focal firm and
a company supplying technical engineering projects belonging
to a construction supply chain. This characterizes the type of
vertical network upstream the flow of goods and services of the
supply chain, as defined by Britto (2000).
Answers provided to the questions asked of the managers of
the companies involved in the bidding process have confirmed
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Table 1
Percentage of the types of consortia formed.
Type of consortium Characteristic Quantity % of the total of consortia % of the total of participants
Horizontal and vertical Competing companies and companies belonging
to the supply chain in relation to the Focal Firm
8 61.54% 57.14%
Vertical upstream Companies belonging to the supply chain in
relation to the Focal Firm
5 38.46% 35.71%
Total of consortia 13 100% 92.86%
Single company Focal Firm Alone 1 – 7.14%
Total of participants 14 – 100.00%
and complemented the information obtained from the documents
analyzed.
The content of the questionnaires answered was analyzed,
whose open-ended questions on this topic were questions 1, 2,
and 6, while the closed questions were 1, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 21.
In open-ended Question 1, respondents were asked about
the types of business networks formed to meet the require-
ments set out by the DPPR, during the bidding stage,
with regard to partnerships with competing and supplying
companies for infrastructure works bidded by the govern-
ment, whose most representative answers are reproduced
below:
Competitive
Advantages
Respondent 4 We look for companies – which
have historically been our
competitors – that could help to
reach the maximum score for our
technical proposal, in order to
provide the proof of experience
in execution of works required by
the Bidding Documents.
Similarly, we sought designer
partners that have historically
been suppliers of engineering
projects for us, which would
complement our skills in order
for us to obtain the maximum
technical score in project design
experience.
Types of
Business
Networks
Respondent 8 We constitute business networks
in consortium with companies
that are usually our competitors
in other bids and a company
skilled in project design [. . .].
Types of
Business
Networks
Respondent 1 Most of the consortia have in
their composition a project
design company to deliver
projects and a competitor.
Complementary
Skills
Respondent 7 For road works sponsored by the
Growth Acceleration Program
[PAC-Programa de Acelerac¸ão
do Crescimento] in the period
between the events, consortia
among competing project design
and building companies in the
national market has been the
dominant type of cooperative
network, [. . .] formation of a
supply chain capable of meeting
the government’s requirements.
Complementary
Skills
Respondent 8 Consortia formation is
motivated by the search for
better skills. However, in
the case of this contract,
given the level of demands
to meet the bidding
requirements, the priority
was finding a company to
form a partnership that
would meet those
requirements.
Competitive
Advantages
and
Outsourcing
Respondent 9 Since integrated
procurement presupposes
that the contractor prepares
the basic project, the
formation of a consortium
between builders and
designers is a natural
condition for participation
in the bidding itself
(attestation of the bidder in
projects). Resistance of
designing companies
against this “forced
consortium” has been
observed, since the
responsibility of the
consortium members before
the Government is fully
shared.
Complementary
Skills
Interview As soon as we got the
tender notice, we realized
that we would have to look
for partners. The minimum
technical requirements for
some items were higher
than the certificates we had.
We noticed that it was not
enough to look for the
companies with which we
usually associate to create
consortia for construction
works. A new element gave
rise to the need to seek
project design companies.
In open-ended Question 2, research participants were asked
about the types of business networks formed to meet the work-
ing requirements, in its execution phase, as to partnership with
competing and supplier companies, whose most representative
answers are reproduced below:
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Complementary
Skills
Respondent 1 The first intention of forming
consortia is to meet the bidding
requirements regarding proof of
technical capacity. This scenario
may change in the medium term,
but, in the short term, the
scenario is: companies consorting
to achieve the goal of “closing
the deal”. Including design
companies in the networks does
not necessarily mean that they
will be the ones executing the
projects.
Outsourcing Respondent 8 [. . .] after signing the contract,
new partnerships with suppliers
and specialized firms are
formalized, although no
exclusivity is agreed upon.
Complementary
Skills
Respondent 3 [. . .] a designer company that
holds certificates meeting the
qualification required for bidding
is part of the consortium, but they
simply sell their certificates and
will take part in about 1% of the
contract.
Outsourcing Respondent 4 Once the contract has been
signed, the previously formed
network should extend its
branches, hiring partners with the
‘fine-tuned’ expertise necessary
for the “details” of the enterprise,
without granting exclusivity so
that we are not dependent on a
supplier.
Complementary
Skills
Respondent 3 [. . .] The motivation behind
forming consortia is not the
search for higher skills, but aims
only to meet the bidding
requirements for proof of
technical capacity.
Outsourcing
and
Competitive
Advantages
Respondent 11 The integrated procurement
DPPR also seeks to allow
companies to present new
technologies. Therefore, the
government assesses whether the
projects comply with the norms
and guidelines of the
organizations accountable, not
influencing the partners of
subcontracting companies, nor
their suppliers. Companies are
free to look for the best supplier,
which offers the lowest price,
with no influence on their global
price agreed upon with the
contractor.
Competitive
Advantages
Interview An advantage observed in our
contract is the participation of the
designers in the daily
construction operations. Project
demands have always been a
bottleneck in the continuity
works. This type of contract
facilitates the design
decision-making with quick
solutions that reflect on the works
progress.
Open-ended Question 6 asked respondents about how con-
sortia can influence the quality and agility of services provided
for infrastructure works signed with the government. The most
representative answers are found below:
Complementary
Skills
Respondent 7 These partnerships aim to merge
skills, where product quality and
the desired profit will only be
achieved by participants who
master their technical areas. Only
then can they achieve their goals
and, consequently, provide
quality services to the
government.
Outsourcing
and
Competitive
Advantages
Respondent 1 [. . .] Including design companies
in the networks is key for the
agility and productivity of
construction work, considering
that DNIT is no longer a mediator
between builder and designer.
Now, the relationship between
builder and designer is
straight-forward.
Complementary
Skills
Respondent 4 Surely, one motivation is the
pursuit for competence and
agility for a more qualified end
product, particularly with the
project partnership without DNIT
mediation.
Competitive
Advantage and
Types of
Networks
Respondent 5 [. . .] The new possibility of
having the designer at the core of
the consortium is an advantage in
terms of performance
improvement.
Complementary
Skills
Interview [. . .] The presence of the designer
as a member of the consortium
makes project solutions
immediate.
It was evidenced in the answers that the types of networks,
in the form of consortia, were vertical and horizontal in relation
to the Focal Firm. Consortia were established among competing
companies and project suppliers.
An important aspect to be observed is the perspective of the
designer who felt compelled to participate in a consortium in
order to get the project design contract, and was subsequently
jointly and severally liable for the work execution: “There has
been a resistance of designer companies regarding this “forced”
consortium, since the liability of consortium members before
the government is joint and several” (Respondent 11).
Notably, respondents indicated that the primary concern of
the networks’ focal firms was around meeting the bidding
requirements in order to attain the maximum technical score.
The construction work executive project may or may not be
drawn up by the consortium’s designer company. However, the
importance of the designer in constituting the consortium during
the execution of construction work was clear, even if it acts as
project outsourcing manager.
It was also observed that, during execution of works, the
consortium originally constituted cannot be modified. New part-
nerships are made through supply contracts and contracting of
specialized companies without, however, signing an exclusive
contract with new partners.
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Analysis of the responses clearly indicates that participa-
tion of designer companies in consortia constitution improved
agility in solutions toward adapting projects, which eliminates
work stoppages due to potential uncertainties related to technical
issues.
In that vein, closed questions number 1, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 21
were analyzed. Table 2 presents the closed questions addressing
topics related to cooperative networks among companies and the
study analysis on these questions.
The criteria and equations described by Sanches et al.
(2011) were used to determine the degree of agreement
with the statement (DAs) for each question answered by
respondents, as is also described in the chapter on the
methodology.
Analysis category 2: innovation in the bidding system
The documents analyzed pertain to the bidding process gov-
erned by DNIT tender notice No. 165/2013. The aforementioned
document describes the criteria established for the bidding sys-
tem, i.e. bidding type, the execution regime and the project
delivery method.
The professionals participating in the study found that
the greatest driver for adoption of the DPPR was agility
in the bidding phase, contract execution, drawing up of the
executive projects, and in the execution and conclusion of
the construction work. Eliminating the executive projects’
contracting and drafting phase represented a procedural econ-
omy allowed by the DPPR. The respondents stated that the
lump-sum execution regime and the risk and responsibilities
matrix of the parties were the most relevant aspects of the
contract.
Regarding the execution regime, respondents stated that
the types provided by the DPPR are part of the payment
criteria already enforced by Law 8.666/1993. Thus, no
innovations regarding the contract execution regime were
observed.
With regard to the project delivery method, respondents iden-
tified an innovation in the procurement system through the
new project delivery method using integrated design-build (DB)
procurement, which changed relationships in the construction
supply chain by moving the project supplier into the consor-
tium contracted. They also reported that the design-build (DB)
project delivery method was the driver for formation of verti-
cal networks between the focal firm and the project supplier
company.
Regarding the bidding type, the study participants reported
that there was no innovation in the DPPR procurement pro-
cess, i.e. in the selection criterion of the company with the
most cost-effective proposal by the lump-sum method, the best
technique, and the combination of best technique and lowest
cost.
The content of the questionnaires answered was analyzed,
whose open questions on this topic were numbers 4, 5, 7, 8, and
9, and closed questions were numbers 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 22.
Open-ended Question 4 asked what was the most relevant
motivation or differential which made the DPPR the most appro-
priate option for the infrastructure work contracts signed with
the government. The main responses were:
Delivery
Method
Respondent 1 DPPR procurement brings
more dynamics to the
contract and to the
execution of the work.
Old-times moorings to the
bidding documents or
constructive methodologies
contained therein no longer
exist, even if the solutions
adopted are still bound to
DNIT’s specifications.
Thus, the works will have
greater agility and less red
tape to block the
process/works.
Delivery
Method
Respondent 3 More agility in the bidding
phase, faster design
adequacy [. . .].
Delivery
Method
Respondent 6 It depends on the type of
DPPR to be tendered, but
the biggest gain is
undoubtedly the speed of
contracting, project design,
and execution of the work.
Execution
Regime and
Delivery
Method
Respondent 7 [. . .] a new posture in both
physical and financial
executive efficiency arises
from the public project’s
contractor, which reduces
the risks of financial
increase to the initial
budget.
Execution
Regime
Respondent 8 Easier adaptability of
designs to the reality at the
moment of execution of the
various phases of the
construction work, which
produces greater accuracy
in the conclusion of the
contract.
Delivery
Method
Interview [. . .] with the designer no
longer acting as a supplier,
but as a partner, solutions to
project issues became more
agile.
Delivery
Method
Respondent 11 The greatest advantage of
DPPR is the time period.
[. . .].
Bidding type Interview [. . .] in this new
procurement system it is
possible to observe a greater
speed to go through all of
the contracting phases.
Bidding type Interview In our case, it was possible
to observe a shorter period
of time than the usual
bidding processes under
Law 8.666/1993 [. . .]. This
was possible due to the
phase reversal, in which
only the winning proposal
is analyzed.
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In open-ended Question 5, participants were asked to state
what the most relevant requirements of the DPPR were in the
execution of an infrastructure work. The main responses were:
Execution
Regime
Respondent 1 Today, bidding documents are
still greatly deficient in terms of
the definition of the risk matrix.
A risk matrix with outstanding
issues entails very high risks for
both sides (contracting/contracted
party) of the contract.
Execution
Regime
Respondent 4 The important thing is that the
contracted network can make
decisions at all phases of the
enterprise, as well as the
lump-sum.
Execution
Regime
Respondent 4 It is possible to have a
well-defined risk matrix, but the
importance given to this
document is a mistake, since
companies have become liable
for nearly everything.
Execution
Regime
Respondent 6 All factors are relevant in DPPR
procurement. Meeting all of the
requirements set out in the
contract is what must be done.
For such, we need well-defined
projects, a clear risk matrix,
lump-sum including all activities
and, most importantly, timely
payment.
Execution
Regime
Respondent 8 The DPPR payment method is
predominantly integrated
procurement at lump-sum.
Execution
Regime and
Bidding Type
Respondent 9 [. . .] there is a misleading
understanding that integrated
procurement works as a way of
transferring all risks to the
contractor, which does not reflect
the reality of administrative law.
In fact, since the contracting
structure is formed at the time of
judgment, a successful
contractual outcome depends,
first and foremost, on the proper
reconciliation of the judgment
criterion and mode of dispute
[. . .]
Delivery
Method
Respondent 9 [. . .] I have observed
inadmissible simplification in the
internal phase of integrated
procurements, with excesses in
the transfer of risk via the matrix
[. . .].
Delivery
Method and
Execution
Regime
Respondent 11 At first, for the enterprise to be
successful, a clear definition of
the contract’s object and the risk
matrix is key to indicate the
liabilities of contracting and
contracted parties.
Delivery
Method
Interview By taking on responsibility for
the preparation of the basic and
executive projects, the contracted
consortium is also liable for most
of the risks related to the
execution of services to complete
the work.
Open-ended Question 7 addresses the bidding type adopted
by the bidding documents and asked respondents to identify
the innovations introduced by the DPPR as to the bidding type
(company selection criterion). The main statements were:
Bidding Type Respondent 1 This criterion does not
present any innovations.
They already existed in Law
8.666/93. The innovation is
the procurement method
and transfer of risks from
the contracting to the
contracted party.
Bidding Type Respondent 4 The criterion of selection
by technique and cost was
already provided for by the
General Bidding Law. In
the case of this tender
notice, each bidder knew in
advance whether or not they
could achieve the minimum
technical skills required.
The study for the
constitution of our
consortium was in order to
obtain the maximum score.
We could not afford to
present the lowest cost and
then lose the contract for
failing to reach the
maximum technical score.
Execution
Regime and
Bidding Type
Respondent 6 The DPPR essentially
contemplates bidding rules.
The biggest innovation was
in the scope of contracting,
integrated procurement,
phase reversal, which
provides greater agility to
the contracting process and
prohibiting amendments.
The selection criterion per
technique and price is not a
novelty in bids, in general
terms.
Open-ended Question 8 addresses the execution regime
adopted by the tender notice. The study participants were asked
to identify the innovations introduced by the DPPR procurement
process as to payment method, as follows:
Execution
Regime
Respondent 4 The execution regime
defined by the bidding
documents is the lump-sum,
which has always been part
of bidding laws in Brazil
[. . .].
Execution
Regime
Respondent 5 Payment proportional to
physical progress is already
commonly used [. . .].
Execution
Regime
Respondent 6 The greatest challenge for
the government is knowing
when to use the lump-sum
criterion with the
measurement per event,
rather than unit prices. The
two procurement models,
DPPR and Law 8.666/1993,
complement each other.
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Open-ended Question 9 addresses the delivery method of the
object contracted that was adopted by the tender notice. Respon-
dents were asked to identify the innovations introduced by the
DPPR regarding the project delivery method (project scope),
whose main manifestations were:
Delivery
Method
Respondent 1 Integrated procurement is
innovative, since it was not
provided for in Law 8.666/1993.
It consists in the freedom of
project design. In theory, the
contracting party does not need to
“approve” the project, it just has
to “accept” it. Approval implies
shared technical responsibility,
unlike acceptance.
Delivery
Method and
Bidding Type
Respondent 4 The General Bidding Law does
not provide for Integrated
Procurement in the scope of its
modalities. There is only Integral
Procurement, which refers to
contracts that can range from
construction to operation of a
highway, for instance. However,
engineering projects are always
contracted by means of another
bidding process, prior to the
construction work bidding
process [. . .].
Delivery
Method
Respondent 5 While there may be a risk of
on-field project changes
throughout the construction
phase, a design contracted in the
construction phase may reduce
costs. Designing and building on
the same contract is a new way of
procurement.
Delivery
Method
Respondent 7 Integrated procurement was the
biggest innovation [. . .].
Delivery
Method
Respondent 11 Integrated DPPR, in which the
company/consortium is
contracted to prepare the basic
and executive projects, to execute
the work [. . .].
Delivery
Method and
Execution
Regime
Interview [. . .] it is our responsibility to
provide the executive project and
build the road, and this is what
can in fact be characterized as a
novelty in this work.
Delivery
Method
Interview With this type of contract, we
have to manage design and
building, which, despite being a
novelty, is related to how the
contract is conducted rather than
to the executive processes.
Delivery
Method and
Types of
Networks
Interview With the designer ceasing to be a
supplier and becoming a partner,
project design solutions became
more agile.
The perceived innovation was not understood by the
respondents as a radical change from the previous format.
Improvements have been reported in the supply chain con-
straint component, which has not been treated as something that
could modify or create new markets characteristic of the radi-
cal innovations described, according to Davila et al. (2006). An
incremental innovation was observed in the supply chain, in the
business model leverage, by moving the project supplier into the
contracted consortium to deliver the completed work.
All of the inferences made from the answers to the open-
ended questions were confirmed by a set of closed questions,
with the purpose of verifying the degree of agreement of all
respondents.
Table 3 indicates the degree of agreement of the respondents
to each of the inferences made about the bidding system pre-
dicted by the DPPR, arising from the means of each group of
closed questions that confirm the inferences.
Analysis category 3: supply chain
This analysis category identified what most influenced the
construction supply chain as a result of using the DPPR by
analyzing the information contained in the responses to the
interview and questionnaires.
It can be inferred that the biggest effects caused on the sup-
ply chain arise from the restriction of 30% for subcontracting.
In addition, it was observed that the DPPR influenced manage-
ment of the flows of goods and services by moving the supplier of
technical engineering projects into a consortium of companies
by means of integrated design-build (DB) procurement. Inte-
grated procurement of technical projects and construction was
identified by participants as an innovation derived from the use
of the DPPR.
It was observed that the presence of the designer in the daily
operations of construction works provided agility to the correc-
tion actions of projects’ adjustment needs, as inferred by the
analysis of participants’ answers and direct observation at the
worksites.
Open-ended Question 3 addressed the effects on the supply
chain, and open-ended Question 10 addressed what influenced
the supply chain, both effects and influences, as a consequence
of using the DPPR. The closed questions related to the topic
are questions number 2 and 3. The main statements are found
below:
Supply Chain
and
Outsourcing
Respondent 1 Subcontracting remains restricted, just
as in Law 8.666. What happens is an
extrapolation of these percentages by
necessity and the lack of efficient
inspection.
Supply Chain Respondent 1 With executive technical projects being
created and managed directly by the
builder, [. . .] suppliers and service
providers were more confident to
continue activities without
interruptions.
Supply Chain
and
Outsourcing
Respondent 4 [. . .] the establishment of a percentage
(30%) for the outsourcing contract may
be lower than what is needed to hire
specialized companies.
Supply Chain
and
Outsourcing
Respondent 6 [. . .] with the direct relationship
between builder and designer,
unplanned events are reduced.
Supply Chain
and
Outsourcing
Respondent 7 The tender notice limits contracting of
subcontractors at 30%. Not being
restricted by this limit would suit our
contract better. Services requiring
contracting of specialized firms are
higher than the limit set.
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Supply Chain Respondent 8 [. . .] we give suppliers greater
assurance of the continuity of works
when the project is our responsibility.
Supply Chain
and
Outsourcing
Respondent 9 [. . .] it is at the time of quoting that a
commitment to execute at such price is
established. Therefore, at that moment,
control of possible subcontractors,
suppliers, etc. is needed. Preparing a
proposal under the DPPR implies
studying the project, not just filling out
spreadsheets with references.
Supply Chain
and
Outsourcing
Interview Our contract includes many services
that are executed by specialized firms.
The percentage of specialized services
is around 45%.
Supply Chain
and
Outsourcing
Interview Internalization of executive projects,
besides providing greater agility to
solve potential needs of correction,
allows for greater participation of all
the collaborators [. . .].
Table 4 shows the closed questions’ statements that address
matters related to the supply chain of the case studied. Analysis
of these questions was carried out using the criteria and equations
described by Sanches et al. (2011) in order to determine the
degree of agreement with the statement (DAs) of each of the
statements answered by the respondents.
It was possible to identify correlations between the analy-
ses of open-ended and closed questions. The questionnaire’s
closed questions were deliberately prepared in association with
the open questions. Table 5 summarizes the results of this study.
Particularly with regards to inference 1 indicated in Table 5,
related to the networks in consortia, the types observed were
evidenced by the correlation between the theoretical framework
and the documents analyzed, without the contribution of the
study participants, given the theoretical and documentary nature
used for this topic.
The inferences perceived by the researchers presented a high
degree of agreement by respondents. The lowest degree of agree-
ment was 78.79%, assigned to inference 6. The other inferences
showed degrees of agreement above 84%.
Inference 8, which did not identify innovation in the execu-
tion regime (payment criteria), and inference 9, which identified
incremental innovation in the project delivery method, presented
a degree of agreement of 98.48%, indicating a strong intensity
of agreement by the respondents.
Inferences 4, 5, 7, 10, and 11 also presented strong intensity
of degree of agreement by the respondents, above 90%. For
all the above, we verify strong adherence of the researchers’
interpretations to the answers given by the respondents and the
interviewee.
Final remarks
This study does not intend to present generalized results for
bidding processes, works contracted by means of the DPPR, and
cooperative networks among companies in the form of consor-
tium. However, it presents procedures and criteria that may be
used in future studies.
According to the participants, prioritization of the maximum
technical score, in compliance with the requirements of tender
notice, to the detriment of complementary skills, in the search for
partners to form consortia may be an indication that companies
are failing to form partnerships with a potential to offer proposals
with lump-sum costs lower than those presented in tender notice
No. 163/2013.
From the reports resulting from the questionnaires and inter-
views, inadequacy was evident between the requirements of the
tender notice for the formation of consortia and the possible
partnerships among companies with complementary expertise.
A set of liability criteria would be expected, which would nat-
urally induce partnerships among companies that enhance their
technical capabilities.
In the bidding system, there was innovation as to project
delivery method through the use of integrated design-build
procurement. No innovations were identified in the execution
regime (service measurement and payment method) and in the
bidding type (selection criterion for the best proposal).
Encompassing design and building in the same contract is a
technological innovation in the product delivered, which allowed
for a more comprehensive scope of design-build contracts, with
the lump-sum execution regime and greater agility of the con-
tracting processes and execution of works, which opens the
possibility of reducing total costs of projects.
An innovation in the business model, in the supply chain, with
the displacement of designers from their position of project sup-
pliers to the interior of the consortium responsible for deploying
works, was also characterized, which provided greater agility in
the solutions for project adaptation to the needs of the work,
with an effective reduction in the time period of the project
goals.
The DPPR has created agile, economical and efficient forms
for the processes of public procurement of works. In the bid-
ding phase, phase reversal, in which prices are analyzed first,
reduces the period of time of the contracting process. Integrated
procurement eliminates the period of time for procedures nec-
essary to contract design companies and effective preparation of
the project before the construction bid. In the phase of work exe-
cution, integrated procurement makes the solutions of technical
engineering project adaptations more agile.
The agility perceived in the procurement process by the
DPPR is a fundamental factor that can sustain the continu-
ity of its use and maturation. The other objectives pursued
by the DPPR law, related to improvements in competitiveness,
technological innovations, and the treatment of environmental
liabilities, are aspects to be addressed with the maturation of the
DPPR.
The respondents pointed out that the DPPR influences the
supply chain by restricting subcontracting to 30% of the total
contract value. It was verified that specialized services extrap-
olate the contractual limit of 30%, and that it is necessary to
create internal skills to execute the production activities of the
specialized services.
Based on the study performed, it was concluded that
implementation of the DPPR can contribute to improve the effec-
tiveness of public works procurement in general, not only for
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Table 5
Summary of inferences resulting from the analysis of evidences.
Dimension Inference of open-ended questions and
interview
Open-ended
questions
Confirming
documents
Confirming
closed
questions
Mean
degree of
agreement
Intensity
Business
Network
Formation
1. Of the 13 cooperation networks in
consortium that participated in the bidding
process, 5 were vertical upstream in the
supply chain, and 8 were both vertical and
horizontal.
1 Adm.
Proceeding
Tender
Notice No.
165/2013
– – –
2. The consortia initially aimed to meet the
requirements of proof of technical
experience to obtain the maximum technical
score as a competitive advantage, in
compliance with the rules of DNIT Tender
Notice 165/2013.
2 Adm.
Proceeding
Tender
Notice No.
165/2013
9 and 10 84.09% Significant
agreement
3. The originally formed consortia are
maintained throughout the construction
work, and new partnerships are formed with
suppliers and specialized companies.
However, no exclusive contracts are signed
with the new partners in the supply chain.
2 Direct
Observa-
tion
21 and 11 84.85% Significant
agreement
4. The design companies were key to the
composition of consortia, both for meeting
the bidding requirements, and for the
management and preparation of executive
technical projects, being particularly
important in obtaining agility and quality in
the work.
2 and 6 Adm.
Proceeding
Tender
Notice No.
165/2013
and Direct
Observa-
tion
1 and 13 95.45% Strong
agreement
Bidding
System
5. The driver for DPPR implementation was
mainly agility in the bidding phases and
efficiency in the production of the object of
the contract.
4 – 4, 8, 12,
16, 19, and
20
91.41% Strong
agreement
6. The DPPR requirements relevant for
construction works are the execution regime
at lump-sum and the responsibilities required
from contracting parties.
5 Adm.
Proceeding
Tender
Notice No.
165/2013
5 and 22 78.79% Moderate
agreement
7. No innovation was identified in the
bidding type (selection criterion), since all of
the criteria provided by the DPPR are part of
the criteria set forth in Law 8.666/1993.
7 Adm.
Proceeding
Tender
Notice No.
165/2013
6 93.94% Strong
agreement
8. No innovation was identified in the
execution regime (payment criteria), since
the DPPR applies the same criteria used in
Law 8.666/1993.
8 Adm.
Proceeding
Tender
Notice No.
165/2013
7 98.48% Strong
agreement
9. Incremental innovation was identified in
the contracting system for the project
delivery method with the use of integrated
design-build (DB) procurement, which
modifies relationships in the supply chain of
construction works, as it moves the project
supplier into the contracted consortium.
9 Adm.
Proceeding
Tender
Notice No.
165/2013
14 and 18 98.48% Strong
agreement
Supply
Chain
10. The supply chain was notably affected by
the 30% limit for subcontracting.
3 Direct
Observa-
tion
2 96.97% Strong
agreement
11. Integrated procurement allowed for
better management of the supply chain by
means of the direct relationship between
designer and builders, preventing work
stoppage due to need for project adjustments.
10 Direct
Observa-
tion
3 96.97% Strong
agreement
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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construction works related to the sporting events that gave rise
to the DPPR.
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